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eMonopoly 
WHY INTERNET-BASED MONOPOLIES HAVE AN 
INHERENT “GET-OUT-OF-JAIL-FREE CARD” 
INTRODUCTION 
The modern-day reliance on digital media has 
dramatically broadened access to all forms of news, ideas, and 
information.1 This development is due in large part to the 
increased presence of the Internet, which is without precedent in 
openness, universal accessibility, efficiency, and versatility as a 
mode of communication.2 Unfortunately, regulatory laws have 
failed to keep pace with the advance of technology,3 and the 
Internet remains substantially unregulated.4 As a result, the 
most widely used and most “dominant communications medium 
  
 1  See David S. Evans, Antitrust Issues Raised by the Emerging Global Internet 
Economy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 285, 288-89 (2008) (outlining the growing trends of 
access to Internet services via computers and personal computing devices); see also Internet, 
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet#Information (last visited Sept. 28, 2010) 
(“The Web has . . . enabled individuals and organizations to publish ideas and information to 
a potentially large audience online at greatly reduced expense and time delay.”). 
 2 Jay Dratler, Jr., Why Antitrust Matters in Cyberspace: A Brief Essay, 
CYBERLAW, http://gozips.uakron.edu/~dratler/2005cyberlaw/materials/whyantitrust.htm 
(last visited Sept. 22, 2009).  
 3 EDWARD LEE LAMOUREUX ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW & 
INTERACTIVE MEDIA: FREE FOR A FEE 2 (2009).  
 4 Dratler, supra note 2. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
has proposed net neutrality principles that would formalize rules meant to keep 
Internet providers from discriminating against certain content flowing over their 
networks. Saul Hansel, F.C.C. Chairman Is Expected to Propose Neutrality Principles 
for the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2009, at B3. However, if anything this regulation 
only strengthens the claim that Internet content is to a large extent unfettered. 
Moreover, challenges to FCC net neutrality are taking shape in the form of legislation 
seeking to “keep the Internet free from government control and regulation.” Marguerite 
Reardon, Net Neutrality Faces Political, Legal Hurdles, CNN.COM, Oct. 24, 2009, 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/10/24/net.neutrality.politics/index.html.  
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. . . is . . . unregulated and entirely at the mercy of domination by 
private commercial forces acting in their own self-interest.”5 
With the Internet’s unregulated nature threatening 
monopolistic consolidation of Internet services, the specter of 
eMonopolies—those Internet domains that offer an ever-
expanding menu of services, collecting more and more devoted 
patronage among Internet users, and deriving revenue 
exclusively from advertising—is a palpable possibility. In 
response to this threat, antitrust law has been recognized as 
representing the only hope of “prevent[ing] a single private 
firm, or single individual, from ‘cornering the market’ in means 
of [digital] expression.”6 But antitrust enforcement in what has 
been dubbed the “new economy”7 could be problematic because 
enforcement agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), as well as the 
federal courts, arguably lack the resources to cope with such a 
dynamic, rapidly advancing, and innovative economic model.8  
In addition to rapid Internet development, antitrust 
enforcement is further complicated by the nature of the 
Internet-based economy, which grows every year9 and has 
largely been developed on a platform where “information is 
free.”10 The web-based economy’s reliance on the use of free, 
where the market default rate for Internet services is no more 
than the cost of Internet access, represents a significant 
wrinkle for antitrust analysis.11 It allows a web-based firm, 
such as Google—the ubiquitous Internet service provider—to 
  
 5 Dratler, supra note 2. 
 6 KENNETH L. PORT ET AL., LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 426 (2d ed. 2005).  
 7 Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 
925 (2001) (defining the new economy as the industries of computer software 
manufacturing, Internet-based business, and telecommunications services).  
 8 Id. 
 9 As of September 2009, nearly 80% of the North American population has 
access to the Internet—a growth of 140% since the year 2000. Internet Usage Statistics 
for the Americas, INTERNET WORLD STATS, http://internetworldstats.com/stats2.htm 
(last visited Oct. 24, 2010) [hereinafter INTERNET WORLD STATS]. With the advent and 
proliferation of mobile Internet access, this number is expected to rise considerably in 
the coming years. Evans, supra note 1, at 289. 
 10 DAVID B. KOPEL, ANTITRUST AFTER MICROSOFT: THE OBSOLESCENCE OF 
ANTITRUST IN THE DIGITAL ERA 13 (2001).  
 11 See Chris Anderson, Commentary: Google and Microsoft Free-for-All, 
CNN.COM (July 8, 2009, 10:08 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/07/08/anderson. 
google.antitrust.law/index.html. 
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offer a host of free services,12 establish a devoted user base, and 
then generate substantial revenue derived exclusively from 
advertisements.13 Where a firm gains legal monopoly power in 
one service14—such as Google’s arguable monopoly on search 
queries—the firm would face no obstacle in broadening that 
consumer dependence to other services it chooses to acquire. In 
so doing, such a firm could restrict access to information, 
control the advertising markets, and thus control how 
consumers engage in commerce. The problem for antitrust 
analysis arises because consolidation of economic power—
traditionally the target of antitrust laws15—in an economy 
where consumers are not subject to potential market abuses 
because the services are free, may render the antitrust laws’ 
consumer-welfare goals inapplicable. 
This note recognizes the antitrust threat imposed by 
eMonopolies. Specifically, the note will focus on Google,16 which 
is the leading Internet-based business.17 Google has already 
attracted the attention of antitrust regulators and has been 
characterized as “a dominant behemoth, one that ha[s] the 
potential to stifle innovation and squash its competitors.”18 This 
note explains how Internet-based businesses’ reliance on free 
services and the inherent characteristics of the web-based 
business—including rapid technological advancement—
complicate application of the antitrust laws against 
eMonopolies and make any attempts to litigate against Google 
difficult. Consequently, new approaches to antitrust 
  
 12 Services provided by Google include a search engine, e-mail server, map 
generator, and word processor, among many others. GOOGLE, http://www.google.com 
(last visited Jan. 15, 2010). 
 13 Anderson, supra note 11. 
 14 See United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting 
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)) (no antitrust violation 
where the monopolist gained his advantage through “superior product, business 
acumen or history”); see also infra Part I.B.3. 
 15 Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in the 
Twenty-First Century, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 513, 539 (2007). 
 16 Because Google is the current leading Internet-based business and has 
attracted so much attention, this note refers to Google as an example as well as uses 
“Google” as an abstract placeholder for eMonopolies in general. 
 17 To illustrate, as of September 2009, Google held an 80% share of the Internet 
search market, its primary field, while its nearest competitor, Yahoo!, held only 9%. 
Internet Search Mkt Share: Bing’s Loss Is Google’s Gain, ECONOMIC TIMES (Oct. 2, 2009, 
4:40 PM), http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/Internet-search-mkt-share-Bings-loss-is-
Googles-gain/articleshow/5080917.cms [hereinafter Bing’s Loss, Google’s Gain]. 
 18 Fred Vogelstein, Why Is Obama’s Top Antitrust Cop Gunning for Google?, 
WIRED (July 20, 2009), available at http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/magazine/17-08/ 
mf_googlopoly?currentpage=all. 
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enforcement should be implemented, approaches that recognize 
the difficulties of traditional enforcement and take into account 
the noneconomic detriments of monopolies. 
Part I of this note provides a brief history of federal 
antitrust law. It articulates the often-complicated judicial 
interpretation of antitrust principles, particularly with respect to 
Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act,19 which prohibits a single 
firm from becoming a monopoly. Part II explores the world of 
Internet business, focusing on Google’s history and business 
development. It also examines recent Sherman Act antitrust 
actions against Google and other new-economy businesses.  
Part III probes the antitrust implications of such 
Internet-based market power particularly with respect to 
Section 2 monopolization claims. It argues that the web-based 
model of free and the unilateral innovation of Internet 
technology development make application of Section 2 difficult. 
To do so, Part III shows the problematic application of a 
Section 2 claim to an eMonopoly.  
Finally, Part IV suggests how antitrust enforcement in 
the new economy should proceed, including how the 
noneconomic considerations of media consolidation and privacy 
should be included in evaluating the impact of unilateral 
monopolization by eMonopolies. Part V concludes by suggesting 
that antitrust regulators must adopt broad, forward-looking 
analytical models to keep pace with the rapid entrenchment of 
modern eMonopolies.  
I. FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 
The underlying rationale for the federal antitrust laws, 
in large part, has been to combat the perceived dangers of 
concentrated economic power.20 In keeping with the rationale 
that consolidated economic power poses a threat, the goals of 
antitrust legislation have been interpreted to be both social 
(such as maximizing competition and diversifying market 
power for the benefit of free-market entrepreneurs)21 and 
economic (such as protecting the welfare of consumers from 
  
 19 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).  
 20 Stucke, supra note 15, at 539 (explaining that “growing concern for increased 
concentration of economic power” has led to increased antitrust enforcement). 
 21 JOHN H. SHENEFIELD & IRWIN M. STELZER, THE ANTITRUST LAWS 12 (1993). 
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potential abuses resulting from monopoly power or collusive 
horizontal conduct).22  
Competition law in the United States began as a means 
for the federal government to proportionally respond to the 
domination of the nineteenth-century marketplace by rapidly 
growing industrial giants.23 As such, early antitrust 
enforcement targeted smoke-stack industries, such as steel and 
oil24—industries that, unlike Internet-based businesses, 
advanced slowly and attracted infrequent competitive 
entrants.25 The antitrust laws were seen as vital to the 
“preservation of economic freedom and [the United States’] 
free-enterprise system.”26 Indeed, in Northern Pacific Railway 
v. United States, the Supreme Court noted that the antitrust 
regime’s preservation of free and unfettered competition 
“provid[es] an environment conducive to the preservation of our 
democratic, political and social institutions.”27 
The story of U.S. antitrust law begins in 1890 with the 
passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act (the Sherman Act).28 The 
Sherman Act is the “Magna Carta”29 of antitrust legislation and 
all subsequent legislation was enacted to supplement its 
provisions.30 The Sherman Act’s primary operating provisions 
are Section 1, which declares that “[e]very contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to be illegal,”31 
and Section 2, which declares that “[e]very person who shall 
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire 
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the 
trade or commerce” will be guilty of a felony.32 
  
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. at 8 (describing the origin of the term “antitrust” as referring to the 
practice of large enterprises “collecting shareholder voting power in the hands of a 
single managing trustee. Efforts to control these powerful interests were known as 
antitrust laws.”). 
 24 Posner, supra note 7, at 926. 
 25 Id. 
 26 United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).  
 27 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). 
 28 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006). 
 29 Topco, 405 U.S. at 610. 
 30 SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 21, at 14. 
 31 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 32 Id. § 2. 
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A. Sherman Act Section 1—Combination 
Given that any economic combination has at least a 
negligible economic effect on competition,33 Section 1 prohibits 
only those combinations restraining trade that result in some 
cognizable injury to competition.34 Therefore, the Sherman Act 
prohibits only restraints of trade that unreasonably restrict 
competition.35 To determine reasonableness, contemporary 
courts rely primarily on a “rule of reason” analysis to 
determine whether the restraint is likely to have 
anticompetitive effects and, if so, whether the restraint is 
reasonably necessary to achieve procompetitive benefits that 
outweigh those anticompetitive effects.36 Although courts have 
imposed per se liability where the anticompetitive effects of an 
agreement are readily apparent and there are no redeeming 
effects,37 this imposition is strictly limited to circumstances 
where the negative economic impact is immediately obvious.38 
B. Sherman Act Section 2—Monopolization 
This note focuses on Sherman Act Section 2 and its 
applicability to eMonopolies. Unlike Section 1, which explicitly 
requires multilateral conduct in order to find an antitrust 
violation,39 Sherman Act Section 2 outlaws unilateral 
monopolization. To be liable under Section 2, the alleged 
monopolist must possess monopoly power in a relevant 
market,40 and must have acquired or maintained—or attempted 
to acquire or maintain—monopoly power through exclusionary, 
  
 33 SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 21, at 15 (“[E]very sales contract 
removes one buyer and one seller from the market for the duration of the contract, and 
to that extent restrains trade.”).  
 34 Coal. for ICANN Transparency, Inc. v. Verisign, Inc., 567 F.3d 1084, 1089 
(9th Cir. 2009) (citing Kendall v. Visa, 518 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2008)).  
 35 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 87 (1911) (emphasis added).  
 36 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 9 
(2007) [hereinafter DOJ & FTC, PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/innovation/P040101PromotingInnovationandCompetitionrpt07
04.pdf. 
 37 Major League Baseball Props. Inc. v. Salvino, 542 F.3d 290, 315 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 38 Id.; see also, e.g., Toledo Mack Sales & Serv. v. Mack Trucks, 530 F.3d 204, 
220-21 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that a “gentleman’s agreement” among competitor 
dealers to control prices was a per se impermissible horizontal agreement in violation 
of Section 1).  
 39 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (outlawing “contract[s]” and “combinations”).  
 40 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). 
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anticompetitive conduct.41 Consequently, the acquisition of 
monopoly power by possessing a superior product, superior 
business acumen, or favorable history will not give rise to 
Section 2 enforcement.42 
1. Relevant Market 
Defining the relevant market is the first step in 
evaluating a Section 2 claim,43 as it “determine[s] the 
boundaries within which effective competition occurs or, 
conversely, market power is exercised.”44 The relevant market 
refers to the groups of producers that, because of their 
products’ similarity, have the ability—actual or potential—to 
take significant business away from each other.45 A relevant 
market is composed of a product market (identifying what 
service or good is at issue in the applicable competition) and a 
geographic market (identifying the physical boundaries of the 
competition).46 For our purposes, we will not dwell on 
establishing a geographic market. Given the widespread use 
and availability of the Internet—which spans the entire 
developed world47—defining a geographic market establishes no 
practical limit; therefore, we instead focus our efforts on 
defining the product market. 
A relevant product market has historically been defined 
as products “reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the 
same purposes.”48 The idea behind this restriction is simply to 
ensure that competitors are competing in the same 
competition. Picture a consumer who wishes to purchase an 
apple; if he encounters predatory pricing of oranges, it will 
have little impact on his decision to buy an apple and therefore 
will have limited anticompetitive effect on apple merchants. Of 
course, the relevant market definitions litigated in real-world 
  
 41 Id. at 571. 
 42 United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 43 See Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 496 (2d 
Cir. 2004). Where a claim is based on per se unlawful activity, however, no inquiry into 
the relevant markets is required. See, e.g., Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 385 
(9th Cir. 1978).  
 44 SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 21, at 29. 
 45 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 51-52. 
 46 SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 21, at 30-31. 
 47 To illustrate, as of December 2009, 76.2% of the North American 
population has access to the Internet, experiencing a growth of nearly 140% between 
2000 and 2009. INTERNET WORLD STATS, supra note 9.  
 48 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956).  
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antitrust actions are far less simplistic and often involve highly 
subtle market distinctions. To illustrate, in the seminal case 
United States v. E.I. du Pont Nemours & Co.,49 a Section 2 suit 
was brought against a producer of cellophane plastic wrapping. 
The Court held that cellophane wrapping was not a sufficiently 
defined market, as there were other flexible packaging 
materials that a consumer could easily substitute in place of 
the defendant’s cellophane packing material.50 As the next 
section discusses, defining a relevant market in the context of 
an eMonopoly will not be as intuitive.51 
2. Monopoly Power  
Monopoly power is the second element of a Section 2 
violation. Monopoly power refers to the “power to control prices 
or exclude competition” in relation to the relevant market.52 The 
market share held by an alleged monopolist, although not 
dispositive of the ability to control the market, is a strong 
indicator of monopoly power, and courts ordinarily infer 
market power from dominant market share.53 As a result, 
establishing monopoly power is a minimally controversial 
requirement in antitrust analysis.54 Once again, however, 
application of monopoly power in the unique context of an 
Internet-based eMonopoly poses a problem: the inherent 
characteristics of Internet business predispose it to sustained 
monopoly power.55  
3. Anticompetitive Conduct  
The last element of Section 2 monopolization is the 
achievement of monopolistic market power through 
anticompetitive conduct.56 This ensures that competitors who 
achieve their market power through vigorous and honest 
  
 49 Id. at 378. 
 50 Id. at 400. 
 51 See infra Part III.A. 
 52 E.I. du Pont Nemours, 351 U.S. at 391. 
 53 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966) (outlining 
instances where market power was inferred from a showing of market shares of 80%, 
90%, and 87%).  
 54  Id. (stating that monopoly power can generally be inferred from market 
share, whereas the relevant market, in which to measure market share, may be more 
difficult to ascertain).  
 55 See infra Part III.B. 
 56  Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570-71. 
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competition will not be punished for winning the competition, 
and in turn, avoids a disincentive to innovate.57 Innovation is a 
major component of high-technology competition, where 
advancement and development occur at an unprecedented 
pace.58 As such, it is crucial that antitrust enforcement in the 
new economy does not stifle innovation. Therefore, it is 
important that monopolistic conduct require something beyond 
mere dominant market share to avoid punishing a firm for 
securing economic success as a consequence of a “superior 
product, business acumen, or historic accident.”59 Indeed, “the 
law does not make mere size an offense.”60 An antitrust plaintiff 
must show that the defendant’s conduct had an anticompetitive 
effect that outweighs any procompetitive justification the 
defendant may proffer.61 Therefore, exclusion resulting from 
skill or foresight alone will not suffice absent a showing that 
the alleged monopolist acted on some basis other than profit 
maximization or operating efficiency.62  
This standard appears to be straightforward—
establishing a logical demarcation between permissible and 
prohibited conduct. In practice, however, the point at which 
aggressive competition becomes anticompetitive conduct is 
wholly unclear.63 The clemency offered to competitors guilty of 
nothing more than aggressive competition reflects what seems 
to be a cost/benefit analysis and mirrors the “rule of reason” 
analysis applied in Section 1 claims.64 Adhering to this 
characterization of Section 2 anticompetitive conduct, many 
litigants will often have to follow a pattern of allegation and 
counterallegation that looks as follows: (1) plaintiff must allege 
anticompetitive conduct and a resulting anticompetitive effect; 
(2) defendant must counter this allegation by proffering a pro-
  
 57 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 
398, 407 (2004).  
 58 Posner, supra note 7, at 925. 
 59 Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571. 
 60 United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 451 (1920).  
 61 United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 58-59 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 62 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985).  
 63 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM 
CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 34 (2008) [hereinafter DOJ, 
COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/ 
236681.pdf (“While there is general consensus that clearer and more predictable 
standards are desirable, legal scholarship and the record from the hearings suggest far 
less consensus on what those standards should be.”). 
 64 Harry First & Andrew I. Gavil, Re-framing Windows: The Durable 
Meaning of the Microsoft Antitrust Litigation, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 641, 650-51 (2006).  
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competitive justification; (3) the burden then shifts back to the 
plaintiff to rebut the defendant’s procompetitive justification; 
and finally, (4) if the procompetitive justification remains 
unrebutted, the court will weigh the anticompetitive effects 
against the procompetitive justification.65  
C. Sherman Act Section 2—Attempted Monopolization  
Under Section 2, an antitrust action can also be brought 
under an attempted-monopolization theory.66 Unlike straight 
monopolization claims—where the plaintiff must show an 
existing dominance in a relevant market—an attempted-
monopolization claim comes before the creation of monopoly 
power that leads to market abuse.67 An attempted 
monopolization claim requires the plaintiff to demonstrate three 
elements: (1) that the defendant is guilty of anticompetitive 
conduct, (2) that there is a “dangerous probability” of eventual 
monopoly power, and (3) that the defendant had a specific intent 
to achieve such monopolization.68  
The distinctions between straight monopolization and 
attempted monopolization require a brief explanation. First, the 
dangerous-probability element calls for a consideration of the 
“relevant market and the defendant’s ability to lessen or destroy 
competition in that market.”69 Courts generally consider this 
element in much the same way they consider the monopoly-
power element of a straight monopolization claim, taking into 
account, of course, that they are applying a forward-looking 
perspective to the potential of monopolization and not the 
reality.70 Given the theoretical underpinning of the claim, 
however, courts accept a lesser showing of market power for the 
dangerous-probability element.71 
The second peculiarity that distinguishes an attempted 
monopolization case from a straight one—and an element that 
  
 65 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58-59. 
 66 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to 
monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with 
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony.” (emphasis added)).  
 67 See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 454-55 (1993).  
 68 Id. at 456. 
 69 Id. 
 70 See DOJ, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY, supra note 63, at 6-7. 
 71 See, e.g., Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1438 (9th Cir. 
1995) (“[T]he minimum showing of market share required in an attempt case is a lower 
quantum than the minimum showing required in an actual monopolization case.”).  
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will have consequences when applied to an attempted 
eMonopoly—is intent. The Supreme Court has enunciated why 
the intent element inheres in the attempted monopolization 
claim: 
Where acts are not sufficient in themselves to produce a result which 
the law seeks to prevent—for instance, the monopoly—but require 
further acts in addition to the mere forces of nature to bring that 
result to pass, an intent to bring it to pass is necessary in order to 
produce a dangerous probability that it will happen.72 
The distinguishing factor is that an attempted monopolization 
has not yet achieved dominance; its only ostensible infraction is 
amassing a dangerous probability of monopoly power. Thus, to 
criminalize what is not yet a crime, the Court suggests, there 
must be intent to impermissibly “destroy competition or build 
monopoly.”73 
Finally, although conduct that is legal for a monopolist—
efficiency-enhancing aggressive competition—is  necessarily 
legal for an attempted monopolist, the same cannot be said for 
conduct that is ordinarily illegal for a monopolist.74 If a firm 
lacks monopoly power but displays only a probability of potential 
monopoly power, its conduct could not have as much 
anticompetitive impact as a monopolist’s conduct.75 Although 
specific intent can be gleaned from the egregiousness of 
anticompetitive conduct,76 such conduct by a web-based business 
is uniquely difficult to define, making it very difficult to sustain 
an attempted-monopolization claim against an attempted 
eMonopoly.77 
II. ANTITRUST AND THE INTERNET  
Like any other industry, the monopolization of the 
“information superhighway” components is not a surprising 
development. With the increased reliance on digital media and 
the near-ubiquitous presence of the Internet,78 it is no wonder 
  
 72 McQuillan, 506 U.S. at 455 (quoting Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 
375, 396 (1905)). 
 73 Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 626 (1953). 
 74 DOJ, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY, supra note 63, at 6. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 609 n.39 
(1985) (“Proof of specific intent to engage in [monopolistic conduct] may be in the form 
of . . . evidence that the conduct was not related to any apparent efficiency.”).  
 77 See infra Part IV.B. 
 78 See INTERNET WORLD STATS, supra note 9.  
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that Internet-based businesses are seeing growing profits and 
expanding.79 With the growth of some web-based businesses and 
the resulting entrenchment of dominant players, antitrust 
enforcement on behalf of less powerful competitors naturally 
follows to counter this pattern.80 This part will briefly explore the 
nature of Internet businesses. It will focus on Google—the 
modern-day Internet giant—and explore Google’s business 
practices, including its free services and the link to profit-
producing components. In addition, this part will discuss how 
eMonopolies, Google in particular, have been challenged under 
the Sherman Act in the recent years. 
A. Google’s Internet Business 
Google serves as a good example of a potential 
eMonopoly for several reasons. First, Google is the current 
monolith of the digital business world. Not only does it possess 
overwhelming market share in its primary search capacity,81 
but its menu of services seems to grow every day.82 Second, 
Google displays characteristics that both warrant examination 
under, and discourage application of, the antitrust laws. 
Finally, the Obama administration has signaled that it plans to 
reverse the lax enforcement policies of its predecessor and step 
up antitrust enforcement in high-technology markets.83 Google 
is a likely target given its growing stranglehold on Internet 
  
 79 Google announced on October 15, 2009 that its quarterly revenues for the 
quarter ending September 30, 2009 reached $5.94 billion, which represented a 7% 
increase over the revenues generated in the same quarter for the year 2008. Press 
Release, Google, Google Announces Third Quarter 2009 Results 1 (Oct. 15, 2009) 
[hereinafter Google 2009 Third Quarter], available at http://static.googleusercontent. 
com/external_content/untrusted_dlcp/www.google.com/en/us/intl/en/press/pressrel/2009
Q3_earnings_google.pdf. 
 80 In contrast to the increasing revenues reported by Google, see id., Yahoo! 
reported third quarter revenues of $1.575 billion, which represents a 12% decrease from the 
third quarter 2008. Press Release, Yahoo, Inc., Yahoo! Reports Third Quarter 2009 Results 
1 (Oct. 20, 2009), available at http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/YHOO/763515423x0x 
325221/05a85efe-1094-49b2-95bb-6de5ab880392/YHOO_Q32009EarningsRelease_Final.pdf. 
 81 See supra note 17.  
 82 For example, in October 2009, Google released a program called “Google 
Wave” to a limited number of testers. This program combines e-mail, chat, blogs and 
photo sharing into one comprehensive digital format. The program is contemplated by 
Google developers to be the future of online communication, supplanting e-mail. John D. 
Sutter, Google Wave to Be Released to 100,000 Testers Wednesday, CNN.COM (Sept. 30, 
2009, 8:02 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/09/29/google.wave.beta/index.html. In 
addition, Google has recently expanded into travel services, providing information on 
flights and fares directly on its website. Brad Stone & Jad Mouawad, Giant Step into 
Travel for Google, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2010, at B1. 
 83 Vogelstein, supra note 18.  
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business. It has even been singled out as a target by the head 
of the Antitrust Division.84  
So far, Google’s unilateral Internet domination has 
avoided monopolization scrutiny. Although its various 
combinations, such as Google-DoubleClick,85 have raised 
eyebrows across the antitrust-enforcement regime, its 
unilateral conduct has not been subject to scrutiny.86 This can 
be attributed in large part to the very reason for its dominance: 
its superior product and an altruistic business philosophy, 
exemplified by Google’s motto, “Don’t be evil.”87 But because it 
has amassed such dominant market power and because 
government oversight is likely to increase, every new product 
and service Google launches is likely to attract vigorous 
antitrust scrutiny.88  
Google was founded in 1997, offering only a search 
engine.89 This was the first service offered by Google90 and 
remains the service for which it most well known. At the time 
of Google’s founding, search engines were in their infancy and 
were not nearly as effective as they are today.91 Rather than 
directing patrons to the sites that best served their needs, early 
search engines directed patrons to the sites that best served 
the needs of their advertising partners by funneling patrons to 
sponsored sites.92 
Rejecting this consumer-second philosophy, Google 
implemented a revolutionary search-engine model known as 
PageRank, developed by founders Sergey Brin and Larry 
  
 84 Id.  
 85 See infra Part II.B.1. 
 86 Tom Krazit, Google Adjusts to Life with Trustbusters, CNETNEWS.COM 
(Sept. 29, 2009, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-30684_3-10362108-265.html. 
 87 The code of conduct states: 
“Don’t be evil.” Googlers generally apply those words to how we serve our 
users. But “Don’t be evil” is much more than that. Yes, it’s about providing 
our users unbiased access to information, focusing on their needs and giving 
them the best products and services that we can. But it’s also about doing the 
right thing more generally—following the law, acting honorably and treating 
each other with respect. 
Investor Relations, Code of Conduct, GOOGLE, http://investor.google.com/conduct.html 
(last updated Apr. 8, 2009). 
 88 Krazit, supra note 86. 
 89 Greg Lastowka, Google’s Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1327, 1334-35 (2008). 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 1335. 
 92 Id. at 1335-36. 
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Page.93 PageRank is an algorithm-based program that 
calculates a website’s relevance to a user’s query. The program 
first calculates the popularity and importance of a website by 
the frequency with which it is linked throughout the Internet.94 
PageRank then analyzes the text, content, and even 
surrounding web pages of a site to determine how relevant 
those sites are to specific user searches.95 By displaying its 
search results this way, Google separated itself from other 
search engines by returning “noticeably better [results] and 
allow[ing] users to obtain more relevant results in response to 
their search terms.”96  
With its superior product and growing user base, Google 
was able to adopt an advertising scheme that would eventually 
generate 97% of its total revenue.97 Google’s advertising scheme 
employs two main systems, AdWords and AdSense. AdWords 
allows advertisers to select keywords associated with their 
product.98 When a user enters these keywords into a search 
query, the advertiser’s ad is displayed alongside the search 
results as a link in a neutral panel under a header titled 
“Sponsored Links”; the link leads the user to the advertiser’s 
web content.99 This system allows Google to maintain the 
integrity of its search results while simultaneously directing 
users to the maximum number of relevant, paid 
advertisements.100   
AdSense is Google’s second major advertising scheme. 
In some respects, AdSense is a reverse of AdWords. Under this 
program, Google pays third-party websites to display AdWord 
ads generated by Google.101 These are paid directly by Google, 
while Google receives the same revenue generated by AdWords 
  
 93 Id. at 1337. 
 94 Corporate Info, Technology Overview, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/ 
corporate/tech.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2011).  
 95 Id.  
 96 Lastowka, supra note 89, at 1337. 
 97 Google 2009 Third Quarter, supra note 79. 
 98 AdWords, GOOGLE, https://adwords.google.com (last visited Feb. 5, 2011). 
 99 Lastowka, supra note 89, at 1339. The neutral panel displaying the 
advertisement is not necessarily related to the search results. Therefore, Google 
simultaneously returns search results relevant to the search query and unrelated to 
sites from which Google generates revenue—thereby maximizing exposure of 
advertising partners without sacrificing search result integrity. Id. 
 100 Id. at 1338-40.  
 101 See AdSense, GOOGLE, http://adsense.google.com (last visited Feb. 5, 2011). 
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when the embedded AdWords-generated links are used on the 
third-party sites.102  
With the ability to feed off of its dominant market share 
in search and generate impressive advertisement revenues as a 
result of that dominance, Google supplements its search service 
with other programs, such as Google News, Google Docs, and 
Gmail.103 It is capable of such drastic expansion because this 
type of digital expansion requires very minimal start-up costs.104 
In fact, an increasingly common characteristic of Internet 
content is that it is user-generated.105 For example, there is 
social-networking content on Facebook, MySpace, and Twitter, 
and multimedia content on YouTube—virtually all of which are 
user-generated.106 Because these websites have to allot minimal 
resources into generating content, they have very small 
overhead costs, enabling a monopolist like Google to freely 
expand, grow, and entrench itself.  
B. Recent Antitrust Enforcement 
It is no wonder that the characteristics of web-based 
businesses—high rates of innovation, minimal start-up costs, 
and devoted user patronage—can quickly result in substantial 
domination in relevant digital markets. It follows, then, that 
such players in dominant positions are subject to intense 
antitrust investigation. Below is a sample of recent 
investigations and enforcement efforts triggered by the conduct 
of high-technology corporations. Note that investigation of 
Google has focused almost entirely on its multilateral 
combinations, not its unilateral anticompetitive conduct. 
1. Google/DoubleClick Deal—2007 
On April 13, 2007, Google announced its plans to 
“acquire DoubleClick, Inc., a global leader in digital marketing 
technology and services.”107 According to a Google press release, 
  
 102 Lastowka, supra note 89, at 1349. 
 103 See List of Google Products, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
List_of_Google_products (last modified Oct. 20, 2010).  
 104 Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposed Antitrust Approach to High Technology 
Competition, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 86-87 (2002).  
 105  See Evans, supra note 1, at 291. 
 106  Id. 
 107 Press Release, Google, Google to Acquire DoubleClick (Apr. 13, 2007), 
http://www.google.com/intl/en/press/pressrel/doubleclick.html.  
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“[the] transaction [would] strengthen [their] advertising 
network by expanding [their] access to publisher inventory and 
enabling [them] to serve the needs of a broader set of 
advertisers and ad agencies.”108 This result would be achieved 
by combining Google’s already growing search-advertising 
platform with DoubleClick’s innovative digital marketing 
technology that provides graphical display images.109 This 
combination would expand Google’s appeal to corporate 
advertisers and allow it to incorporate third-party 
advertisers,110 such as those associated with Google’s AdSense 
program.111  
This merger was instantly recognized as an antitrust 
concern and was investigated by the FTC112 and later by 
lawmakers in Congress.113 Although much attention was given 
to the privacy concerns implicated by the agreement,114 the 
anticompetitive potential inherent in such a combination 
threatened to further entrench Google in the search-
advertising market to the point where no rival could compete.115 
The FTC eventually approved the agreement when the agency 
found that the agreement did not threaten to reduce 
competition since neither Google nor DoubleClick held “market 
power” in a relevant market.116 Although the agreement 
eventually escaped antitrust enforcement, it is a good example 
  
 108 Id. (quoting Tim Armstrong, Google’s President, Advertising and Commerce, 
North America). 
 109  Id.  
 110 Id. 
 111 See AdSense, supra note 101. 
 112 Iain Thomson, FTC Investigates Google DoubleClick Deal, PCAUTHORITY 
(May 30, 2007), http://www.pcauthority.com.au/News/82399,ftc-investigates-google-
doubleclick-deal.aspx.  
 113 Peter Kaplan, US Lawmakers Plan Google-DoubleClick Deal Hearings, 
REUTERS, July 18, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN183266972 
0070719.  
 114 The agreement increased Google’s capacity to  
stor[e] information obtained through the retention of users’ search terms in 
ways and for purposes other than those consented to or relied upon by such 
consumers; causing them to believe, falsely, that their online activities would 
remain anonymous; and undermining their ability to avail themselves of the 
privacy protections promised by online companies.  
Thomson, supra note 112 (quoting Complaint and Request for Injunction, Request for 
Investigation and Other Relief, In re Google, Inc. and DoubleClick Inc., available at 
http://epic.org/privacy/ftc/google/epic_complaint.pdf); see also infra Part IV.C.2. 
 115 See Kaplan, supra note 113.  
 116 Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement of the FTC Concerning Google/DoubleClick, 
FTC File No.071-0170, at 8-9 [hereinafter FTC on Google/DoubleClick], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0710170/071220statement.pdf. 
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of how Google’s dominant position exposes each of its 
combinations to potential antitrust enforcement. It also shows 
how enforcement efforts have focused almost exclusively on 
Google’s multilateral combinations.117  
2. Proposed Google Books Settlement Agreement—
2008-2009 
Google was also the subject of an antitrust investigation 
in October 2008.118 At that time, a settlement agreement was 
announced in the ongoing copyright-infringement litigation 
between Google, Inc., and the Association of American 
Publishers over the Google Books Project.119 The Google Books 
Project attempted to scan millions of copyrighted works of 
literature into Google’s digital database.120 The agreement—
which would have released Google from copyright liability and 
established a Book Rights Registry with the authority to 
negotiate on behalf of the copyright owners as a class121—
awakened fears of an Internet-based monopoly on digital 
literature.122  
The potential for a single information source through the 
consolidation of media outlets is not unlikely. And it would hinder 
the achievement of media’s primary purpose: a gateway to 
“information that enables citizens to participate in the democratic 
process.”123 The Google Book Settlement Agreement would have 
effectively established a single source for digital copyrighted 
literature and appeared to be an initial stepping stone to a 
  
 117 See Krazit, supra note 86 (highlighting recent antitrust scrutiny limited to 
multi-party collusive conduct). 
 118  See generally James Grimmelman, How to Fix the Google Book Search 
Settlement, J. INTERNET L., Apr. 2009, at 1, 11-20; Statement of Interest of the United 
States of America Regarding Proposed Class Settlement, Authors Guild, Inc., v. Google 
Inc., No. 05-CV-8136-DC (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2009) [hereinafter DOJ Brief], available at 
http://thepublicindex.org/docs/letters/usa.pdf. 
 119  See Proposed Settlement, Authors Guild, No. 05-CV-8136-DC, available at 
http://www.googlebooksettlement.com/r/view_settlement_agreement.  
 120 Jonathan Band, A Guide for the Perplexed: Libraries and the Google Library 
Project Settlement, AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION (Nov. 13, 2008), http://www.arl.org/ 
bm~doc/google-settlement-13nov08.pdf. 
 121 Proposed Settlement—Article VI, Authors Guild, No. 05-CV-8136-DC, 
available at http://www.googlebooksettlement.com/r/view_settlement_agreement. 
 122 See generally Grimmelman, supra note 118. 
 123 Sen. Paul Wellstone, Growing Media Consolidation Must Be Examined to 
Preserve Our Democracy, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 551, 551 (2001). 
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consolidation of information sources, akin to the consolidation 
observed in other media.124 
Indeed, the antitrust implications of the settlement 
garnered so much opposition that the agreement was scrapped,125 
and a modified settlement was negotiated. Paramount among 
the opponents was the DOJ, which filed a statement of interest 
in the case.126 The DOJ’s brief highlighted the difficulties raised 
by the Books Rights Registry—namely, its exclusive authority to 
negotiate on behalf of the certified class and its inclusion of 
orphan works.127  
The DOJ raised several arguments. After making 
arguments not directly relevant to this note,128 the DOJ 
contended that the agreement granted Google substantially 
unrivaled ability to sell a complete database of “orphan 
works.”129 Orphan works are copyrighted works of copyright 
holders who are difficult or impossible to contact.130 If Google is 
given exclusive right to display these works, and their orphan 
status precludes others from making similar agreements, no 
other competitor would be able to match that capability. In so 
doing, the DOJ argued, Google would erase any possibility of 
interchangeability.131  
In light of the DOJ’s objections and the accompanying 
threat of litigation, the settlement was revised, and a modified 
agreement was filed in federal district court on November 13, 
2009.132 The revised agreement addressed the DOJ’s concerns 
  
 124 See Viktor Mayer-Shonberger, In Search of a Story: Narratives of 
Intellectual Property, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH. 11, ¶¶ 36-37 (2005). Mayer-Shonberger 
documents how the “six major” telecommunications companies control over 96% of the 
market in cinemas and that the mergers creating AOL/Time-Warner and the like will 
only expedite that consolidation. Id. ¶ 42. 
 125 Motoko Rich, Google to Revise a Book Pact by Nov. 9, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 
2009, at B2.  
 126 See generally DOJ Brief, supra note 118. 
 127 Id. at 24. 
 128 The DOJ first challenged the class certification arguing that it violated 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Id. at 4-5. Next, the DOJ argued that the Books 
Rights Registry would give the publishers, acting collectively, impressible authority to 
restrict prices in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 16.  
 129 Id. at 24. 
 130 Orphan Works, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orphan_works (last 
modified Sept. 14, 2010). 
 131 DOJ Brief, supra note 118, at 24.  
 132 Amended Settlement Agreement, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 
05-CV-8136-DC (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2009), available at http://books.google.com/google 
books/agreement. The Court granted preliminary approval on November 19, 2009. See 
Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Amended Settlement Agreement, Authors 
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and amended those sections that would have granted Google 
sole control over orphan works.133 It stipulated that the “power 
to act with respect to the exploitation of [orphan works] . . . 
under the Amended Settlement will be delegated to an 
independent fiduciary.”134 The fiduciary would act as a trustee 
and would contract, on behalf of the unclaimed works, with 
companies that wished to digitize these works.135 Therefore, 
under the amended agreement, companies other than Google 
would have the opportunity to digitize orphan works, whereas 
the original agreement gave these rights only to Google, 
eliminating any potential competitive advantage.136 
Google Books provides a good example of how a web-
based business can use the unique capabilities of the Internet 
to expand a well-established business platform. Google 
attempted to garner a settlement that not only would have 
given it sole control of an entire category of literature—orphan 
works—but also would have imposed a heavy burden on its 
competitors that sought to reach an analogous agreement.137 As 
a result, Google raised the eyebrows of antitrust enforcers and 
attracted heavy criticism. But once again, that criticism, 
exemplified by the DOJ’s brief, relied on antitrust violations 
resulting from combination and contract, not unilateral 
anticompetitive conduct.138 
3. Intel Litigation—2009  
Although Google seems to have escaped antitrust 
liability under Section 2, other new-economy firms have been 
successfully sued for Section 2 violations. A recent example is 
the New York State Attorney General’s suit against Intel Corp. 
  
Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 05-CV-8136-DC (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2009), available at 
http://books.google.com/googlebooks/agreement. 
 133  Brad Stone & Michael Helft, Google and Partners Revise Terms of Digital 
Book Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009, at B2.  
 134 Amended Settlement Agreement at sec. 6.2(b)(iii), Authors Guild, No. 05-
CV-8136-DC, available at http://books.google.com/googlebooks/agreement. 
 135 Stone & Helft, supra note 133.  
 136 Id. 
 137 See Grimmelman, supra note 122, at 14. Professor Grimmelman argues 
that, although the settlement agreement did not explicitly prevent others from 
implementing a book scanning program and seeking licenses independently, the 
transactional costs associated therewith would have precluded any such effort, while 
Google would take advantage of a settlement giving it clean release and an instantly 
negotiated position. Id.  
 138  DOJ Brief, supra note 118, at 17 (citing violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1, which 
outlaws collective action). 
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Filed on November 3, 2009, the attorney general’s complaint 
alleged that Intel illegally monopolized the microprocessor 
market.139 Specifically, the complaint alleged that Intel abused 
its 80% market share of the microprocessor market by using 
“threats and coercion, bribing and bullying to preserve its 
market dominance.”140 In so doing, the complaint contended, 
Intel anticompetitively strengthened its position in the market 
by preventing computer manufacturers (such as Dell) from 
installing microprocessors manufactured by Intel rivals (such 
as Advanced Micro Devices).141  
The allegations in New York’s suit are certainly serious. 
Intel argued that its conduct benefitted consumers by providing 
lower prices and promoting efficient innovation.142 This 
argument highlights the difficulty of Section 2 enforcement in 
high-technology markets. Nevertheless, the allegations 
represent the nature of anticompetitive conduct typical of 
successful Section 2 claims. In fact, Intel eventually settled the 
suit—and others based on similar impermissible conduct—for 
$1.25 billion.143 While the Intel litigation is a good example of 
high-technology Section 2 enforcement, it falls short of showing 
how like claims would be levied against web-based businesses 
like Google, whose anticompetitive conduct is more ambiguous 
and whose business takes place in a far more innovative 
environment.  
III. APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES TO EMONOPOLIES 
Antitrust enforcement of new-economy markets faces 
obstacles for various reasons, ranging from the industry’s 
dynamic nature to the antitrust enforcement regime’s relative 
inexperience in the industry.144 Further complications arise 
  
 139 See generally Complaint, New York v. Intel Corp., No. 09-CV-827 (D. Del. 
filed Nov. 3, 2009), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2009/nov/ 
NYAG_v_Intel_COMPLAINT_FINAL.pdf. 
 140  Id. ¶ 9.  
 141 Ashlee Vance, State Accuses Intel in an Antitrust Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 
2009, at B1.  
 142 Id. 
 143 Press Release, Intel Inc., AMD and Intel Announce Settlement of All 
Antitrust and IP Disputes (Nov. 12, 2009), http://www.intel.com/pressroom/archive/ 
releases/2009/20091112corp_a.htm?iid=pr1_releasepri_20091112ra. 
 144 See Piraino, supra note 104, at 69-71. Piraino argues that antitrust 
enforcement may not be apt for high technology markets because the “pace of 
technological change is so swift, and so transforming, that no firm can hold monopoly 
power in a high technology market for a meaningful period,” id. at 70, and that “courts 
 
2011] eMONOPOLY 751 
from the Internet’s model of free, as it is incongruent with the 
underlying rationale of antitrust law. Antitrust law stems from 
the idea that competition in a relevant market requires 
potential competitors to make products at a minimal input cost, 
and at a price likely to attract consumers—all while turning a 
profit.145 Internet businesses’ model of free, on the other hand, 
operates mostly on advertising revenue with near-zero 
production costs.146 This translates to no cost for the consumer. 
Therefore, the traditional model of antitrust—where economic 
effects like pricing take center stage—is seemingly inapplicable 
when confronting an Internet business unlikely to impose 
abusive price restrictions on consumers.  
Of course, a distinction must be made in the ability to 
impose price restrictions between the impact on consumers and 
the impact on customers. The customer of a search engine is 
not a web user. The contention that Google—or any other 
eMonopoly—operates entirely on free is a mischaracterization 
of the industry. If this were the case, and there were no 
revenue generating component, there would be no desire to 
ensure free competition in the first place. Rather, Google 
operates as a “multi-sided platform,” providing “goods or 
services to two or more distinct groups of customers who need 
each other in some way and who rely on the platform to 
intermediate transactions between them.”147 
Advertisers are the customers of a web-service provider, 
and it is advertising space and other for-pay services148 offered 
by these Internet businesses that give rise to the threat of 
anticompetitive and abusive conduct. But a potential advertiser 
would not allot substantial expense for advertising space on 
Google just because it is available. Rather, an advertiser 
invests substantial advertising expenses on those sites that 
offer the broadest exposure. Therefore, advertisers will 
intuitively prefer sites with a wider market share of popular, 
free online services. As a result, a business that offers one 
component, infinite in supply and at no cost (i.e., a search 
engine, e-mail, instant messaging, etc.), uses the dominant 
  
and antitrust enforcement agencies” simply know too little about the economic 
implications of these businesses. Id. at 69.  
 145 SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 21, at 7. 
 146 See Anderson, supra note 11 (“[T]he incremental cost of serving one more 
Web page to one more user is almost nothing—and falling as technology gets cheaper.”). 
 147 Evans, supra note 1, at 292-93. 
 148 Take, for example, the profits that would be generated under the Google 
Books Settlement Agreement. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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market share in that component to influence the value of an 
unrelated component that is in finite supply (i.e., advertising 
space) and for which it can charge a price.149 In other words, it is 
a website’s popularity with consumers that makes it wealthy, 
not its popularity with advertisers.150 As a result, 
monopolization of the former threatens monopolization of the 
latter.  
Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits the 
unilateral monopolization of a relevant market by means of 
exclusionary or anticompetitive conduct.151 But due to the 
peculiarities of the Google monopoly—particularly with respect 
to the means by which market power has been amassed—
traditional Section 2 actions will have difficulty surviving 
motions to dismiss. To present a cognizable claim under Section 
2, plaintiffs must show not only monopoly power in a relevant 
market, but also the “willful acquisition or maintenance of that 
power as distinguished from growth or development as a 
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic 
accident.”152 Plaintiffs have struggled to establish relevant 
markets in the context of search-engine monopolization and 
distinguish unlawful anticompetitive conduct from lawful 
acquisition of market power,153 both of which suggest hampered 
potential for antitrust enforcement.  
This part will look at how the development of high-
technology antitrust application and the nature of Internet 
business pose a problem for Section 2 enforcement against 
unilateral eMonopolies by demonstrating the difficulty of 
satisfying the essential elements of a Section 2 claim. 
A. Relevant Market  
The first issue in relevant market analysis is how the 
concept of interchangeability carries over to Internet 
  
 149 See Mike Masnick, The Grand Unified Theory on the Economics of Free, 
TECHDIRT.COM (May 3, 2007, 12:23 PM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20070503/ 
012939.shtml.  
 150 Cf. Lastowka, supra note 89, at 1330-32 (explaining the Google founders’ 
understanding that a successful search engine tailors to the needs of the consumer first). 
 151 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).  
 152 Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 
398, 407 (2004) (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)). 
 153  See, e.g., Live Universe, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., 304 Fed. App’x 554 (9th Cir. 
2008); Person v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-7297, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47920 (N.D. Cal. 
June 25, 2007); Kinderstart.com, LLC, v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-7297, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 22637 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007); see also infra Parts III.A.1, III.A.3. 
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businesses, many of which provide their services free of charge. 
Some courts have held that, where services are provided for 
free, the absence of sales precludes the existence of a relevant 
market.154 Other courts have been less restrictive in their 
interpretation, holding that relevant markets can exist in the 
absence of sales where services are provided for free.155 
As noted above, the free services offered by websites like 
Google, including e-mail, maps, and search, are not the only 
products offered. On the contrary, what these companies sell is 
advertising space, a limited resource that rises in value in 
direct proportion to the popularity of the free, infinite 
resources.156 In this regard, antitrust plaintiffs have argued that 
search advertising is a relevant market “because there are no 
effective competitive alternatives to search advertising 
available to search advertisers.”157 Moreover, they argue, search 
advertising is unique compared to other advertising because 
search advertising is married to search queries in a way that 
allows an unparalleled level of relevance in the advertising 
displayed on the webpage.158 In other words, search advertising 
displays advertisements calculated to appeal to specific users 
because they are generated by a manifestation of that user’s 
interest—the search query. Other forms of advertising do not 
have such fine-tuned mechanism for identifying consumer 
interests.  
At least one court has rejected the argument that search 
and search advertising are, in and of themselves, relevant 
markets. In Kinderstart.com LLC v. Google, Inc., the plaintiff 
alleged that Google had violated Section 2 by attempting to 
monopolize two distinct markets: the Search Market and the 
Search Ad Market.159 The Northern District of California 
disposed of the Search Market argument on the grounds that 
search is only a gateway to revenue from other sources and 
  
 154 See, e.g., Person, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47920, at *11 n.6 (acknowledging 
the rejection of the search market as a relevant market); Kinderstart.com, 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 22637, at *15 (declining to define a relevant market in terms of search 
engines, noting that there is “no authority indicating that antitrust law concerns itself 
with competition in the provision of free services”). 
 155 See, e.g., Live Universe, 304 Fed. App’x at 556 (acknowledging the existence 
of defendant’s dominant market share in the social networking website market).  
 156 See Masnick, supra note 149. 
 157 Complaint at ¶ 61, TradeComet.com LLC v. Google, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 2d 
370 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09-CV-1400), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/ 
district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2009cv01400/340565/1/0.pdf. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Kinderstart.com, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22637, at *12-13. 
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that no revenue is derived directly from search.160 Because the 
service is free and nothing is being sold, the court held that the 
plaintiff could not demonstrate a “grouping of sales” necessary 
to establish a relevant market.161 
The court disposed of the Search Ad Market theory as 
well, holding that search advertising is too narrow a definition 
of a relevant market because it is no different than general 
advertising; therefore, the two can be reasonably 
interchanged.162 The court reasoned that search and general 
advertising were indistinct because an advertiser can simply 
choose to post advertisements independently of any search.163 
There is not much judicial analysis of search and search 
advertising as a relevant market under Section 2. The search 
market—and the fact that it is free—represents a uniquely 
difficult application. Although a product exists that can be 
interchanged by users, the absence of sales may make that fact 
irrelevant. As the Kinderstart.com court noted, some courts 
characterize relevant markets in terms of “grouping of sales” 
and “buyers.”164 This definition could indicate that sales or 
exchanges are required for a relevant market. But this remains 
an open question.  
As for the search ad market, it is likely that future 
courts will not follow Kinderstart.com’s narrow interpretation 
of relevant markets to search advertising. If the underlying 
limit of a relevant market is the set of products that are 
“reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same 
purposes,”165 and in this context, the consumer is an advertiser, 
there may be weight to the argument that the search ad results 
are programmed differently and provide a substantially 
different product—namely, results catered to the interests of 
the user versus general advertising.166 On the other hand, the 
argument can be made that search advertising is simply 
superior (as opposed to different) and, therefore, the court in 
  
 160 Id. at *15. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. at *16. 
 163 Id. 
 164 See id. at *14 (quoting Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 
1434 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A ‘market’ is any grouping of sales whose sellers, if unified by a 
monopolist or a hypothetical cartel, would have market power in dealing with any 
group of buyers.” (emphasis added))).  
 165 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956). 
 166 See Complaint at ¶ 61, TradeComet.com LLC v. Google, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 
2d 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09-CV-1400), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/ 
federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2009cv01400/340565/1/0.pdf. 
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Kinderstart.com was right to reject a distinction between 
search advertising and general advertising.167 
Given the limited litigation on search and search 
advertising as relevant markets, it remains unclear how they 
will be interpreted in the future. One suggested approach has 
been to define relevant markets based on a distinction between 
markets for data and markets for the expanded use of data.168 
Commentators have argued that drawing this distinction 
would appropriately acknowledge the function of Internet 
business and, in so doing, identify markets actionable under 
Section 2.169 It would seem, however, that this approach, which 
defines markets abstractly based on the subtle nuances of 
Internet business, would be just as problematic as definitions 
based on the subtle differences between search and search 
advertising. Regardless of the approach, application of this 
Section 2 element poses a potential obstacle to future antitrust 
enforcement against eMonopolies.  
B. Monopoly Power  
After defining the relevant market, a Section 2 claim 
requires a showing that the alleged monopolist possesses 
monopoly power in the relevant market sufficient control that 
market.170 Although market share is a powerful indicator of 
monopoly power in a relevant market, other characteristics can 
contribute to a finding of monopoly power, such as the freedom 
of entry into the field.171 
1. Market Share  
By all accounts, Google has a dominant share of the 
Internet-search market.172 As discussed above, the general view 
is that “high market share, though it may ordinarily raise an 
inference of monopoly power, will not do so in a market” where 
  
 167 See Kinderstart.com, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22637, at *16. 
 168 Pamela Jones Harbour & Tara Isa Koslov, Section 2 in a Web 2.0 World: An 
Expanded Vision of Relevant Product Markets, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 769, 772-73 (2010).  
 169 Id. at 773, 785-86. In addition, the authors point to investigatory precedent 
to defend the position of defining markets based on data collection. See id. at 787-92. 
 170 See E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 351 U.S. at 391 (monopoly power is “the 
power to control prices or exclude competition”). 
 171 See United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 54-55 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 172 See supra note 17. 
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the alleged monopolist cannot exert market control.173 But 
Google’s share of the Internet-search market is nearly 80%.174 
This market share, although not a complete domination of the 
search market, embodies overwhelming market power given 
that Google’s nearest competitor is Yahoo! at a paltry 9%.175 In 
light of the Google search engine’s strong user base and vitality 
to the overall structure of e-commerce,176 such a 
disproportionate market share may very well indicate 
monopoly power. 
2. Barriers to Entry 
Although market share alone may be sufficient to 
establish monopoly power in a relevant market,177 market share 
can be misleading because it represents today’s reality without 
consideration of contrary developments tomorrow.178 Other 
factors thus become relevant in the analysis as well. One 
intriguing concept in determining the existence of monopoly 
power is the presence of barriers to entry. A barrier to entry is 
essentially a characteristic or structural reality of the relevant 
market that prevents emerging entrants from establishing a 
foothold, and, as a result, protects an entrenched competitor’s 
dominant position.179 
In United States v. Microsoft, the court examined the 
barriers to entry in the software market.180 The court explained 
how the software industry is subject to a “chicken-and-egg” 
scenario that precludes emerging entrants from entering the 
field.181 According to the court, because most consumers prefer 
  
 173 Oahu Gas Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Res., Inc., 838 F.2d 360, 366 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(internal citations omitted).  
 174 Bing’s Loss, Google’s Gain, supra note 17. 
 175 Id.  
 176 See Kinderstart.com, LLC v. Google, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22637, at *11 
(N.D. Cal. 2007) (plaintiff argued that Google’s search engine is an “essential facility” 
for offering, marketing and delivering services over the Internet and Google’s conduct 
in administering the search engine affected competition).  
 177 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966). 
 178 See Ball Mem’l Hosp. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., 784 F.2d 1325, 1336 (7th Cir. 
1986) (“Market share reflects current sales, but today’s sales do not always indicate 
power over sales and price tomorrow.”); Hunt-Wesson Food, Inc. v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 
627 F.2d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 1980) (“Blind reliance upon market share, divorced from 
commercial reality, could give a misleading picture of a firm’s actual ability to control 
prices or exclude competition.”). 
 179 See United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 54-55 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. 
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operating systems that already support a large number of 
applications, and because most manufacturers will develop 
applications supported by only the most popular operating 
systems, Microsoft’s current market control will only 
perpetuate and expand.182 A competitor would not be able to 
muscle into the market because application developers would 
not write applications for their operating systems as there are 
no consumers. Likewise, no consumers would purchase the 
operating system because it does not have applications written 
for its use.  
This phenomenon is clearly present in the case of a 
Google eMonopoly and may in fact be even more restrictive than 
Microsoft’s monopoly against potential competitors. In the case 
of an eMonopoly that predicates its dominant market position on 
free online services through a website, there is a substantial 
likelihood that the website will have a large user base. With a 
large user base comes more advertising revenue. This finite 
market for revenue-generating advertising is contingent upon 
the value of the unlimited free component183—the very same 
component over which the eMonopoly already possesses a 
monopoly market share. Therefore, an emerging entrant will not 
have the opportunity to generate sufficient user traffic to 
overcome the entrenched competitor’s dominance.184 Moreover, at 
least in the case of Google, the predicate monopoly over search 
has arguably been achieved through a substantially superior 
product.185 Although there is a barrier to entry precluding a 
competitor from establishing a foothold in the market, the 
barrier was erected through superiority, not an attempt to 
exclude a rival. Therefore, the barrier may not be an 
impermissible result of anticompetitive behavior.186 
C. Anticompetitive Conduct  
The third element of a Section 2 claim presents the 
biggest obstacle when applied to Internet-based monopolies 
like Google. Because anticompetitive conduct must be 
  
 182 Id. 
 183 See Masnick, supra note 149. 
 184 TradeComet.com LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 09-CV-1400 at ¶ 67 (S.D.N.Y. 
filed Feb. 17, 2009), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-
york/nysdce/1:2009cv01400/340565/1/0.pdf. 
 185 See infra Part III.C. 
 186 See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 
(1985) (prohibiting exclusion of a rival only when doing so achieves no efficiency).  
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aggressively competitive (directly impeding the success of 
competitors), as opposed to passively competitive (impeding the 
success of competitors indirectly by having a better product), 
the conduct of a major online monopoly does not fall clearly 
within the definition of anticompetitive conduct.  
To illustrate this concept, consider Google’s market 
share in Internet search and search advertising. Assuming, 
under the above analysis, that Google does have the power to 
shape the e-commerce marketplace,187 this lopsided market 
share only satisfies the first prong of a Section 2 claim. The 
plaintiff would still have to show anticompetitive conduct. 
In Google’s case, anticompetitive conduct would be 
difficult to establish because Google’s dominance is the result of 
an arguably superior product, which is perfectly permissible 
under Section 2 jurisprudence.188 At the time Google launched 
in 1997, the search-engine market was infested with inefficient 
systems that failed to provide users with relevant or useful 
results.189 Instead, early search engines offered search results 
linked to advertisers.190 Google’s founders brought a new 
philosophy to search engines that revolutionized the industry.191 
Google veered from the default algorithm approach to parsing a 
website’s relevance, instead using a formula that calculated the 
frequency with which a website is hyperlinked as a barometer 
for relevance.192 The PageRank system “made Google’s search 
results noticeably better and allowed users to obtain more 
relevant results in response to their search terms.”193 
Therefore, we see that Google has not developed its 
dominant market share of the search market by illegal 
anticompetitive means. Rather, through its superior product, 
Google has “acquire[d] monopoly power by establishing an 
infrastructure that renders [it] uniquely suited to serve [its] 
customers.”194 As a result, advertisers naturally gravitated to 
Google.195 Unfortunately for Google’s competitors, the antitrust 
  
 187 See supra Part III.B. 
 188 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966). 
 189 Lastowka, supra note 89, at 1335.  
 190 Id. at 1335-36. 
 191  See id. at 1337. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 
398, 407 (2004).  
 195  See Lastowka, supra note 89, at 1339-40 (discussing the development of 
Google’s advertising platform and resulting advertising revenue).  
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laws do not prohibit “compet[ition], whether against the 
competitive fringe in its monopoly market or against potential 
competitors, as vigorously as a firm in an ordinary competitive 
market . . . [,] provided it doesn’t employ tactics calculated to 
drive an equally” equipped competitor from the market.196  
That being said, a large focus of antitrust in the new 
economy is the ability of a firm with monopoly share to ward off 
new entrants and prevent efficient challenges to a monopoly in 
another market.197 In this sense, it is possible for Google to take 
its dominant market share in search, which is free to the 
consumer, and link it to another service. In so doing, Google 
would effectively bar competitors that do not enjoy a dominant, 
preexisting client base from challenging a potential Google 
monopoly in that ancillary service.198 
Would Google’s attempt to link its preexisting search 
market dominance with a secondary digital service, such as a 
potential Google Books Project, constitute anticompetitive 
conduct rendering the monopoly illegitimate?199 Generally, 
conduct will be deemed anticompetitive if it negatively effects 
the competitive opportunities of rivals and lacks an 
independent business justification that furthers competition on 
the merits.200  
Two Section 2 cases shed light on the practice of linking 
a new service to preexisting market power. In Live Universe, 
Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that MySpace 
deactivated the embedded links on its social-networking site 
that led users to the plaintiff’s networking site.201 The plaintiff 
  
 196 Posner, supra note 7, at 931. 
 197 Id. at 931-32. 
 198 See Gary L. Reback, Remarks at the New York Law School Conference: D 
Is for Digitize (Oct. 10, 2009), video available at http://www.nyls.edu/centers/harlan_ 
scholar_centers/institute_for_information_law_and_policy/events/d_is_for_digitize/program). 
 199 See Stone & Mouawad, supra note 82 (quoting Samuel R. Miller, antitrust 
lawyer at Sidley Austin) (“Every time Google makes another acquisition, it only 
reinforces the argument that they are basically trying to acquire other companies that 
may present potential competition to their core dominance in paid search.”). 
 200 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 n.32 
(1985); see, e.g., Coal. for ICANN Transparency, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 611 F.3d 495, 
503-09 (9th Cir. 2010) (defendant’s predatory litigation activity aimed at coercing 
plaintiff to perpetuate defendant’s role as exclusive regulator of the dot-com domain 
name market by awarding defendant contract extension without any competitive 
bidding was found to be anticompetitive conduct because it lacked any independent 
business justification).  
 201 Live Universe, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., 304 Fed. App’x 554, 556-57 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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alleged that this was a refusal-to-deal202 course of conduct and 
constituted anticompetitive exclusion of a competitor.203 The 
Ninth Circuit disagreed and held that MySpace’s decisions 
concerning the content that it displayed on its site were not 
made for any purpose beyond maximization of profits.204 
Therefore, despite MySpace’s concession that it had monopoly 
market share in social networking,205 MySpace’s conduct in 
administering and censoring that monopoly was not subject to 
antitrust oversight absent a claim that the conduct lacked an 
independent business justification.206 
In United States v. Microsoft, the government accused 
Microsoft of anticompetitive monopolization in bundling its self-
designed Internet browser, Internet Explorer, with its already 
popular Windows operating system.207 Microsoft was found to 
have an overwhelming dominant market share: 95% of the 
defined market of Intel-compatible PC operating systems.208 
Because Microsoft prohibited removal of Internet Explorer from 
its operating interface, computer manufactures were given no 
choice but to promulgate the use of Microsoft’s browser.209 By 
mandating retention of its own browser and effectively barring 
the use of rival browsers (specifically the Netscape-designed 
Navigator browser) Microsoft could avoid the threat of other 
browser manufacturers amassing enough usage to attract 
developers to other operating systems.210  
The D.C. Circuit concluded that Microsoft’s conduct had 
an anticompetitive effect because manufacturers had a 
disincentive to install rival browsers.211 This effect, the court 
noted, “reduce[d] the usage share of rival browsers not by 
making Microsoft’s own browser more attractive to consumers 
but, rather, by discouraging [manufacturers] from distributing 
  
 202 Refusal to deal is a theory of liability wherein a monopolist, under certain 
circumstances, cannot refuse to deal with a rival. See DOJ, COMPETITION AND 
MONOPOLY, supra note 63, at 119-20.  
 203 Live Universe, 304 Fed. App’x at 556. 
 204 Id. at 557. 
 205 Id. at 556.  
 206 Id. at 557. 
 207 United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  
 208 Id. at 54.  
 209  Id. at 60-61.  
 210 Id. at 60. 
 211 Id. at 61. The Court accepted the manufacturers’ claim that dual installation 
of rival browsers would lead to user confusion, which would increase the manufacturers’ 
support costs when they inevitably dealt with associated consumer inquiries. Id. 
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rival products”212 and, in the absence of any justification beyond 
preserving operating system monopoly, Microsoft’s conduct was 
most decidedly anticompetitive.213 This case provides a useful 
look at a high-technology firm linking a preexisting market 
share with burgeoning aspects of its overall business scheme. 
Microsoft was found liable under Section 2 because it took 
affirmative steps to reduce its rivals’ market share with no 
independent business justification of furthering competition on 
the merits. 
Live Universe and Microsoft do not bode well for 
antitrust enforcement against modern eMonopolies, 
notwithstanding the distinct advantage firms like Google 
would possess. It is unlikely that Google’s conduct would be 
considered tantamount to Microsoft’s “unlawful campaign to 
eliminate competition, deter innovation, and restrict consumer 
choice.”214  
First, by supplementing its menu of services and 
expanding on its dominant control of web traffic, Google would 
be doing nothing more than controlling the content on its own 
web pages in an effort to maximize profits. As in Live Universe, 
without a showing that Google is acting contrary or beyond this 
objective, no anticompetitive conduct will be found.215 Generally, 
courts refuse to find anticompetitive conduct where the 
defendant acts to promote its own competitive appeal.216  
Similarly, Google would not be forcing anyone’s hand in 
mandating use of the ancillary service. Microsoft was 
admonished for prohibiting removal of an application from an 
operating system of which it had a monopoly market share217 
because, by doing so, it prevented rival software developers 
from offering their own browsers. As a platform provider, 
Microsoft could impermissibly control the availability of 
competitor-developed applications because it controlled the 
  
 212 Id. at 65.  
 213 United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 66.  
 214 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of Assistant Attorney 
General Joel I. Klein, Filing of Antitrust Suit Against Microsoft (May 18, 1998), 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/1998/1770.pdf. 
 215 See Live Universe, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., 304 Fed. App’x 554, 557 (9th Cir. 
2008). 
 216 See, e.g., Four Corners Nephrology Assocs., P.C. v. Mercy Med. Ctr. of 
Durango, 582 F.3d 1216, 1225 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that a refusal to deal with 
plaintiff was justifiable because it sought to “avoid an unprofitable relationship, and 
that the [defendant] pursued the course it did to protect and maximize its chances of 
profitability in the short-term.”). 
 217 United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 61 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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medium by which those applications were delivered—the 
operating system.218 Google, on the other hand, would be 
supplementing its own online services. It would be providing its 
own applications to its own platform, unlike Microsoft’s vertical 
restriction that allowed it to control the service that gave life to 
competitors’ products.219 Where Microsoft mandated 
implementation of its product, Google would be merely making 
its services available to anyone who chooses to use it. Those 
that choose not to use it can simply use the Internet without 
going through Google.220  
An argument can be made, however, that Google, in 
returning results for its own services more favorably than those 
of competitors, is eschewing its PageRank search formula and 
promoting its own welfare anticompetitively.221 If Google is 
indeed promoting its own self-interest at the expense of even-
handed application of its PageRank formula, any resulting 
monopoly in ancillary services would stem from something 
beyond its superior product.  
In this case, Google may be exposed to liability under 
the essential-facilities doctrine. The essential-facilities doctrine 
imposes liability when a firm in control of an essential facility 
denies a second firm access to a service necessary for 
competition and accessible only through that essential 
facility.222 It requires a showing that (1) a monopolist had 
control of an essential facility, (2) a competitor lacks the ability 
to duplicate the facility, (3) the monopolist denied use of the 
facility to the competitor, and (4) the facility could be 
reasonably provided.223 The argument would allege that 
Google’s search engine, powered by PageRank, represents an 
essential facility for offering, marketing and delivering services 
  
 218 See Philip J. Weiser, Regulating Interoperability: Lessons from AT&T, 
Microsoft, and Beyond, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 271, 271 (2009) (examining the antitrust 
implications of the tensions between producers of applications and the producers of the 
platforms on which applications are run).  
 219 See id.  
 220 Vogelstein, supra note 18. In fact, Google CEO Eric Schmidt contends that 
this voluntary use of Google is a conscious strategy implemented in response to 
Microsoft’s “misdeeds.” Id.  
 221 Cf. GARY L. REBACK, FREE THE MARKET!: WHY ONLY GOVERNMENT CAN KEEP 
THE MARKETPLACE COMPETITIVE 160-61 (2009) (explaining the allegations that Microsoft, in 
the 1990s, used its dominant position in the operating system market to anticompetitively 
enable Microsoft software developers to obtain an advantage over competitors). 
 222 Robert Pitofsky et al., The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under U.S. 
Antitrust Law, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 443, 446 (2002).  
 223 MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983).  
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over the Internet.224 By refusing to grant certain competitors 
access to the benefits of PageRank, the agreement goes, Google 
is denying those competitors access to the facility. Given 
Google’s predominance in search and its large user base, rivals 
would be unable to duplicate its utility.  
This argument will fall flat as well. Courts impose 
liability based on the essential-facilities doctrine infrequently 
because it is difficult to characterize a facility as truly 
essential.225 A facility is essential “only if control of the facility 
carries with it the power to eliminate competition.”226 Thus, “a 
plaintiff must show more than inconvenience, or even some 
economic loss; he must show that an alternative to the facility 
is not feasible.”227 Although Google’s PageRank-powered search 
engine has been proven to be the superior alternative, it is not 
the only feasible alternative. A competitor can use any number 
of other search engines to expose Internet users to its product. 
Therefore, although Google’s refusal to grant a competitor 
equal access to the PageRank system might reduce the 
competitor’s expectant profits, it does not eliminate 
competition; as a result, it will not trigger liability under the 
essential-facilities doctrine.228  
Google’s rapid development of services—a characteristic 
of the eMonopoly environment—does not naturally implicate 
anticompetitive conduct. Innovation in Internet services is a 
fast-paced phenomenon; therefore, it is very easy for an 
entrenched firm to legally pursue expansion and efficiency to 
strengthen its dominant position.229 Innovation gives a web-based 
business the ability to maximize its efficiency and expand its 
user base by providing products of increasing quality at 
marginally increasing costs.230 Therefore, Google is arguably not 
engaging in anticompetitive conduct because its goal is merely to 
  
 224 See Kinderstart.com, LLC, v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-7297, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 22637, at *11 (N.D. Cal. 2007).  
 225 Pitofsky et al., supra note 222, at 449. 
 226 Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 544 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 227 Twin Labs., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 570 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 228 See Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 545-46 (stating that Alaska Airlines’ 
exclusive control of computerized reservation systems did not implicate essential 
facilities doctrine because, although control of the system gave them a monetary 
advantage over competitors, it did not grant them the power to entirely eliminate 
competition given the existence of other, albeit inferior, alternatives).  
 229 Piraino, supra note 104, at 84-85.  
 230 Id. at 86. 
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provide useful and diverse services for Internet users.231 Any 
resulting monopoly is simply a natural byproduct.  
IV. FUTURE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT OF EMONOPOLIES  
The antitrust enforcement regime has several avenues 
of recourse to prevent an eMonopoly from escaping unilateral 
antitrust scrutiny. But the peculiarities of the eMonopoly 
environment, as applied to the conduct of a unilateral 
monopolist, impede effective enforcement. This suggests that 
an unconventional approach may be required and that 
nontraditional considerations be taken into account.  
A. The Waiting Game—The Naturally Correcting Market  
One of the most fervent arguments in modern antitrust 
enforcement is that free markets will eventually correct 
themselves and if left alone by government regulators and 
enforcers, will often reallocate resources efficiently.232 As a 
result, “any company’s attempt to secure market power would 
most likely be defeated by other profit-maximizers,” whether 
they are “new entrants or existing competitors.”233  
This argument is appealing to the new-economy 
markets in which eMonopolies operate because of the 
propensity for fast and efficient technological turnover, which 
can quickly relegate a one-time monopolist to a second-tier 
player. Oftentimes, “the pace of technological change is so 
swift, and so transforming, that no firm can hold monopoly 
power in a high technology market for a meaningful period.”234  
The Microsoft case235 is illustrative. At the time of the 
government’s suit, Microsoft was found to possess 95% market 
share of the defined market of Intel-compatible PC operating 
systems.236 But at the dawn of the twenty-first century, before 
the Microsoft appeal was even concluded, technology and 
Internet dependence were pushing PCs out as the dominant 
mode of computing. The trend moved towards non-PC Internet 
  
 231 Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Cutis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 
407 (2004) (explaining that the purpose of the anticompetitive conduct requirement is 
“[t]o safeguard the incentive to innovate”).  
 232 Stucke, supra note 15, at 539-40.  
 233 Id.  
 234 Piraino, supra note 104, at 70. 
 235 United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  
 236 Id. at 54.  
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devices eschewing physical hard drives and operating systems 
for the Internet-based data storage and application services 
that Google exemplifies.237 In fact, by 2002, it was estimated 
that Microsoft produced less than 50% of the devices providing 
Internet access.238 Indeed, Microsoft currently finds itself as a 
spectator to the growth of Google, which is quickly expanding 
and dominating the modern high-technology marketplaces.239 As 
a result of the naturally occurring innovation and turnover 
present in high-technology markets, antitrust suits could be 
faced with the threat that, “[b]y the time [a] case is over, the 
court may be asked to restructure an industry that has already 
restructured itself.”240 
This same capacity for innovation and quick, efficient 
modernization, however, will ultimately preclude a naturally-
correcting-market strategy. The main reason is that a 
dominant firm in today’s Internet-based economy will continue 
to dominate rather than yield to the next wave of technological 
advancement. Google continues to grow and expand.241 What 
was originally a search engine is now a search engine, e-mail 
service, news outlet, and web-browser developer among other 
services.242 In fact, as technology made its most recent evolution 
into mobile computing and mobile Internet access, Google 
adapted accordingly and unveiled its own mobile computing 
device—an attempt to retain dominance as computing shifts 
from one generation to the next.243 The same characteristics 
that erected a barrier to entry for emerging competitors in 
established markets will carry over to emerging markets, and 
passive resistance will only result in further entrenchment.244 
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B. Proactive Attempted-Monopolization Litigation  
If waiting will only exacerbate the problem, perhaps 
Google’s expansion into other areas could give rise to an 
attempted monopolization claim.245 As discussed above, 
attempted-monopolization is present when there is a “dangerous 
probability” of eventual monopoly power as a result of 
anticompetitive conduct.246 The threat remains that Google could 
use its dominant position to expand into other areas while 
competitors would be precluded from doing so.247 Not only would 
Google benefit from the resources it could employ in research 
and development, but it would benefit from an established 
preexisting platform to offer its new service. Given Google’s 
preexisting user base and reputation for offering unique, 
efficient web-based services, it would enjoy large immediate 
exposure as well as a level of immediate legitimacy. This would 
most certainly give them an advantage over competitors, which 
would only perpetuate their dominance over the Internet.  
However, modern antitrust jurisprudence does not 
preclude a firm from benefitting from a permissibly obtained 
competitive advantage.248 Indeed, “[i]t is the possibility of success 
in the marketplace, attributable to superior performance that 
provides the incentives on which the proper functioning of our 
competitive economy rests.”249 Therefore, it would be unfair and 
unsupported to penalize Google for taking the intuitive step of 
expanding on what has proven successful. 
Attempted monopolization based on illegal bundling or 
tying is another possible route for antitrust litigation. Tying 
occurs when a firm “sell[s] one product but only on the 
condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) 
product, or at least agrees that [it] will not purchase that 
product from any other supplier.”250 A violation of Section 2 
under a tying theory requires the sale of  
two separate products or services . . . [whereby] the sale or 
agreement to sell one product or service is conditioned on the 
purchase of another . . . [and where] the seller has sufficient 
  
59, 107 (2008) (“Given the information asymmetries and barriers to entry, the market 
appears unlikely to ‘heal itself’ . . . .”).  
 245 Vogelstein, supra note 18.  
 246 See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993). 
 247 Krazit, supra note 86. 
 248 PAGE & LOPATKA, supra note 240, at 16. 
 249 Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 281 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 250 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958). 
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economic power in the market for the tying product to enable it to 
restrain trade in the market for the tied product . . . .251 
Fortunately for Google, several factors bar this theory 
from prohibiting its expansion into, and offering of, new 
Internet services. First, as discussed above, Google’s services 
are offered for free, and no consumer is placed in the position 
where the purchase of A necessitates the purchase of 
B. Second, and perhaps more importantly, Google is not 
bundling its services to the point of coercion. As Google CEO 
Eric Schmidt points out, Google has made it a conscious 
business strategy not to mandate use of its services.252 Internet 
users are free to avoid the use of Google and its services; it is 
reliance on their superior product that allows them to maintain 
dominance. Finally, the practice of combining its services may 
simply provide Google with an added economic bonus based on 
an efficient interconnected business model, unencumbered by 
high marginal costs.253 Therefore, when a Google search turns 
up results for Google Maps, or Google News, or even a video on 
Google-owned YouTube, it would not constitute tying. Google 
would be merely offering the user the services and not 
mandating its selection. 
Nevertheless, future antitrust enforcement against 
Google should focus on its attempts to monopolize markets as 
opposed to those markets over which it has already established 
monopoly power. By focusing on its future conduct and 
remaining vigilant, regulators can avoid the assumption that 
Google has developed its monopoly based solely on its superior 
product and instead catch any of its anticompetitive behavior.  
C. Sociopolitical Considerations  
The difficulty of traditional antitrust enforcement of 
eMonopolies suggests that the economic effects of antitrust are 
not the only considerations that should be taken into account. 
Noneconomic considerations should be made a component of 
antitrust analysis as well.254 As Robert Pitofsky observed, “It is 
bad history, bad policy, and bad law to exclude certain political 
  
 251 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 177 
(6th ed. 2007). 
 252 Vogelstein, supra note 18.  
 253 See Evans, supra note 1, at 304. 
 254 Louis B. Schwartz, “Justice” and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 
127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076, 1080 (1979).  
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values in interpreting the antitrust laws.”255 Indeed, as the 
Supreme Court has noted, the antitrust laws “provid[e] an 
environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic, 
political and social institutions”256 not limited to economic 
markets. Given the difficulties of antitrust application to 
eMonopolies, socioeconomic considerations may well provide an 
alternative means of checking unilateral domination of the 
Internet economy.  
Specifically, the social effects of a consolidated Internet 
media must play a role in finding antitrust violations.257 In 
applying the “rule of reason”—which weighs the 
anticompetitive and pro-competitive effects of monopolistic 
conduct258—the sociopolitical goal of maintaining firm diversity 
in media can provide antitrust enforcers with a legitimate 
foothold to attack Internet monopolies. Moreover, the 
potentially detrimental privacy concerns associated with 
domination by an eMonopoly like Google provide yet another 
anticompetitive effect that should be considered.  
1. Media Consolidation  
An important caveat to antitrust analysis in the context 
of eMonopolies lies in the nature of the business. Much of the 
content offered by Internet-based monopolies revolves around 
consolidation of information and digital media.259 Given the 
increasing access to the Internet260 and the consolidation of 
services on a limited number of websites, media consolidation 
is a real possibility.  
Suppose a single Internet service provider, in the Google 
mold, builds a web-based conglomerate that has an exclusive 
license to display the content of the top-twenty American 
newspapers. The exclusivity of the agreement, under which a 
licensor has granted a right to display certain material 
  
 255 Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 
1051 (1979). 
 256 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). 
 257 See Pitofsky, supra note 255, at 1051 (“It is bad history, bad policy, and 
bad law to exclude certain political values in interpreting the antitrust laws.”). 
 258 DOJ & FTC, PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION, supra note 36, at 9. 
 259 See Wellstone, supra note 123, at 551; see also supra Part II.B.2 
(discussing the Google Books Project). 
 260 See supra note 9. 
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exclusively to one licensee,261 implicates antitrust laws because 
the potential output and price abuses may adversely affect on 
competition.262 A restraint in a licensing agreement (such as the 
restraint of exclusivity) requires an evaluation under the “rule 
of reason,”263 which necessitates a showing that the “particular 
contract or combination is in fact unreasonable and 
anticompetitive.”264 
Any anticompetitive effects that may result from this 
(hypothetically) broad exclusive license could be justified if the 
restraint is necessary to achieve legitimate procompetitive 
effects.265 But where an exclusive agreement of such breadth 
involves the licensing of ideas, information, and news, it has 
the potential to directly affect consumers—implicating 
concerns beyond economics. When diversity of ideas and 
opinions is so restricted and media access is whittled to a single 
source—producing a single stream of thought—there may be 
lasting effects on the efficient administration of a 
representative democracy,266 which relies on popular access to 
diverse sources of information.267 
Although this appears to be an issue of free speech and 
free press implicated by the First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, First Amendment protections apply only against 
government action.268 Therefore, where the restriction is 
imposed by private contract, the First Amendment does not 
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apply.269 Antitrust laws, on the other hand, apply almost 
exclusively to private conduct and are therefore the only means 
to avoid a detrimental effect on information access.270 
The anticompetitive effects resulting from such a broad 
exclusive agreement go beyond economics and enter the 
sociopolitical realm—restricting access to diverse media and 
limiting the available streams of ideas, which, in turn, can 
hinder the functioning of the democratic process. Because these 
consequences are so important and far-reaching, they should be 
considered in balancing the anticompetitive consequences with 
the procompetitive benefits.271 
2. Privacy Concerns  
Privacy concerns represent another effect of Internet 
monopolization that warrant consideration under the “rule of 
reason” analysis.272 The nature of Internet business requires user 
input in return for a service; in the case of Google, a user inputs 
a search query and is rewarded with search results. But to 
provide web-based businesses with a basis to tailor appropriate 
advertising, businesses collect enormous amounts of data about 
users without their permission and, in many cases, without their 
knowledge.273 Google has been accused of recording “all data 
being transmitted over open Wi-Fi networks,” websites visited, 
videos watched, and even every e-mail sent or received.274  
The natural propensity for Internet businesses to rely 
on users’ personal information raises a profound issue of 
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privacy. Indeed, the very scope of collected personal 
information is vast. Consider that millions of searches are 
recorded on Google every day; with each entry Google can 
archive personal “interests, needs, desires, fears, pleasures, 
and intentions,” as demonstrated by each search.275 This 
collected personal information is a danger to personal privacy—
one that, some commentators argue, the current privacy 
protection framework is not suited to cope.276  
Given that monopoly share for a web-based business 
relies on a monopoly-sized user base, it follows that those 
companies with dominating user share will likewise pose the 
biggest threat to privacy on the Internet. Accordingly, antitrust 
analysis may offer a solution to the murky privacy concerns 
raised by eMonopolies.  
For example, much of the FTC investigation surrounding 
Google’s merger with DoubleClick arose from the privacy 
concerns raised by the merger. The concerns generally focused 
on the fact that both companies dealt largely with online 
advertising and relied to a large extent on collecting user 
information. The fear was that combining the two sets of 
personal information increased the potential that a large 
number of Internet users would be subjected to privacy 
invasion.277 In the end, the FTC refused to consider privacy 
concerns as “the sole purpose of federal antitrust review of 
mergers and acquisitions is to identify and remedy transactions 
that harm competition.”278 
Still, given the breadth of the privacy intrusions and the 
inability of other areas to cope with the potential threat, 
Section 2 claims of unilateral monopolization offer an 
intriguing platform to address these concerns. Considering that 
contemporary antitrust law focuses on consumer welfare—and 
therefore looks at how certain conduct will affect the 
consumer—it makes sense that consumer-welfare 
considerations not be limited to economics.  
Rather, antitrust review should take into account 
normative factors and the overall impact an eMonopoly can 
have on the lives of a consumer. Put simply, if an eMonopoly is 
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allowed to dominate the digital markets, and its domination 
relies on the collection and implementation of private personal 
information, the growth of the eMonopoly will affect the 
privacy of more and more individuals. As a result, consumers 
may become wary of blindly providing personal information. 
However unlikely, if manipulation of private information 
continues, it could spell decreased reliance on Internet 
businesses and an anticompetitively harmful effect on the 
market as a whole.  
V. CONCLUSION  
Application of federal antitrust laws to Internet-based 
businesses poses a major problem. For a variety of reasons, 
eMonopolies represent a unique context for contemporary 
antitrust enforcement. This is particularly true with respect to 
Section 2 unilateral monopolization claims. Rapid innovation and 
technological advancement allow dominant players to rapidly 
grow and expand, further entrenching their dominant position. In 
addition, eMonopolies’ dominant positions are predicated on free 
services, supported by a “multi-sided platform.”279 And therefore, 
without a threat of consumer abuse, the consumer welfare goal of 
antitrust legislation is inapplicable. Finally, as is the case with 
Google, technological innovation tends to produce products that 
are simply superior; consequently, any resulting monopoly would 
not be impermissible. 
Nevertheless, it is important that steps be taken to 
prevent eMonopolies from abusing a legally obtained monopoly 
in order to anticompetitively dominate other markets. Because 
there is substantially limited regulation of the Internet in other 
areas, antitrust may be the only existing solution.280 Therefore, 
antitrust enforcement should adopt a forward-looking approach 
and be vigilant of Internet-based monopolies’ activities. 
Although monopolists will have already gained monopoly 
power, this tactic will prevent them from abusing that position 
and acting anticompetitively in other markets. Alternatively, 
traditional antitrust enforcement should broaden the scope of 
its analytical considerations and consider sociopolitical issues 
like media consolidation and privacy. Both are implicated by 
eMonopoly development, and both represent serious concerns. 
  
 279 See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 280 See PORT ET AL., supra note 6, at 426.  
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As a result, these factors should be included in weighing 
anticompetitive effects. Only by adopting these measures can 
antitrust effectively challenge eMonopolies and promote 
competition on the Internet. 
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